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A GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF
CONTRIBUTION AND CLAIM
REDUCTION IN ANTITRUST TREBLE
DAMAGE SUITS
JOHN CIRACE*

Under the antitrust laws of the United States, convicted violators are jointly and severally liable for three times the damage attributable to their illegal acts.1 Thus, as a matter of right, plaintiffs
need not sue all antitrust violators who have injured them and, at
the limit, may elect to place the entire burden of compensatory
and punitive damages on one violator.2 Recently, defendants in
treble damage suits have argued that allowing plaintiffs to choose
which 6f them will bear a potentially huge judgment gives plaintiffs unfair bargaining leverage. Consequently, defendants have
sought via third-party complaints to require alleged coviolators,
who have not been sued by plaintiffs, to contribute to the judg* Chairman, Department of Economics, Herbert H. Lehman College of the City
University of New York; B.A., Harvard University, 1962; J.D., Stanford Law School, 1967;
Ph. D., Columbia University, 1975.
1 See Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 58 F.R.D. 9, 10-11 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (citing Walker
Distr. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1, 8 (9th Cir. 1963); Washington v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 280 F. Supp. 802, 804-05 (W.D. Wash. 1968)). The statutory basis
for civil liability is found in section 4 of the Clayton Act, which provides that "[a]ny person
who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the
antitrust laws may sue therefor ... and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 4,
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
2 Washington v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 280 F. Supp. 802, 804-05 (W.D. Wash.
1968); see Solomon v. Houston Corrugated Box Co., 526 F.2d 389, 392 n.4 (5th Cir. 1976). In
Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957), the
plaintiff settled out of court with all but one of the co-conspirators for a total payment of
$20,000. At the trial, the jury found actual damages of $50,000. The court held that the
single defendant who had gone to trial was liable for treble the total amount of actual damages, $150,000, less the $20,000 payment by the settling co-conspirators. Id. at 397-98.
In a nationwide class action involving an entire industry, a sole defendant may have
damages exceeding one billion dollars assessed against it. See, e.g., In re Corrugated
Container Antitrust Litigation, 84 F.R.D. 40, 41 (S.D. Tex.), aff'd mem., 606 F.2d 319 (5th
Cir. 1979), cert. dismissed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3281 (U.S. Oct. 21, 1980), (liability of nonsettling
defendants estimated at $600 million to $3 billion).
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ment liability.3
There is conflict among federal courts of appeals as to whether
a right to contribution should be created as a matter of antitrust
common law.4 In order to resolve this conflict the Supreme Court
has granted certiorari in Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc. 5 The contribution question is also important because the
3 E.g., Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179
(8th Cir. 1979); Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., No. 75-2820 (E.D.
La. Oct. 5, 1977), ajfd, 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. grantedsub nom. Texas Indus.,
Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, 101 S. Ct. 351 (1980); In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litigation,
J.P.M.D.L. No. 248 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 1, 1978), aft'd, 607 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1979); In re Fine
Paper Antitrust Litigation, 82 F.R.D. 143 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Hedges Enterprise v. Continental
Group, Inc., 1979-1 Trade Cas. 62,717 (E.D. Pa. 1979); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 84 F.R.D. 40 (S.D. Tex.), aft'd mem., 606 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
dismissed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3281 (U.S. Oct. 21, 1980); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 82
F.R.D. 652 (D.D.C. 1979); Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., No. 75-23-N (M.D. Ala. March
15, 1979); El Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co., 1977-1 Trade Cas. 61,533 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
Since there is no statutory right of contribution in federal antitrust law, courts have
found it necessary to consider the contribution question as a matter of federal common law.
Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d at 900, 901 n.7. At one
time, many American jurisdictions denied contribution to all tortfeasors based upon the
early English case of Merryweather v. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (1799). RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF ToRTS § 886A, Comment a (1977). The American common-law rule was criticized as
unfair, however, because it denied contribution even where the harm was inflicted negligently. Id.; W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 50, at n.60 (4th ed. 1971). A substantial number of
the states have allowed contribution among tortfeasors, either by statute or judicial decision, id., but the majority of jurisdictions have formulated diverse rules limiting the scope of
contribution, and have denied its application to intentional tortfeasors. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A, Comment a.
In the context of antitrust litigation, however, federal courts generally have refused to
allow contribution. E.g. Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert, 276 F.2d 614, 616 (3d Cir. 1960); Olson
Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 1977-2 Trade Cas. 61,698 (D. Utah 1977); El Camino
Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co., 1977-1 Trade Cas. 1 61,533 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Sabre Shipping
Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); See Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 58 F.R.D. 9 (N.D. Ga. 1973). A single circuit has held that contribution is allowed in antitrust cases at the discretion of the trier of fact upon consideration of
the factors enumerated in Justice White's concurrence in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Paper Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968). Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National
Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979). Professional Beauty Supply did not
involve the problem of settling defendants, however, see id., at 1184, and the reaction to the
decision has been mixed. Compare Sellers, Contributionin Antitrust Damage Actions, 24
VILL. L. REV. 829, 848-52 (1978-1979) with S. 1468, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10, 125 CONG.
REc. 8931 (1979). Subsequent federal court decisions have retained the no-contribution rule.
Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
grantedsub nom. Texas Indus. Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, 101 S. Ct. 351 (1980); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 606 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. dismissed, 49
U.S.L.W. 3281 (U.S. Oct. 21, 1980); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 82 F.R.D. 652
(D.D.C. 1979).
1 Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, 101 S. Ct. 351 (198041 cert. from, Wilson P.
Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979). In another recent
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United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary has reported out
a bill favoring a right to contribution in antitrust treble damage
suits involving price fixing.6 Moreover, the American Bar Association (ABA) is on record as favoring contribution,7 and several commentators also have argued in favor of at least a limited right of
contribution.8
The choice between joint and several liability without contribution, at one end of the spectrum, or contribution at the other,
will have a marked impact upon pretrial settlement negotiations.
The Article will attempt, therefore, to demonstrate through elecase, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal after granting certiorari because the parties
settled out of court, rendering the antitrust contribution question moot. In re Corrugated
Container Antitrust Litigation, cert. dismissed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3281 (U.S. Oct. 21, 1980). The
speed with which the Supreme Court replaced the CorrugatedContainer case indicates the
importance of the antitrust contribution issue. N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1980, at D3, col. 1.
I S. 1468, 96th Cong., 1st Seas. 9-10, 125 CONG. REc. 8931 (1979); see Antitrust Equal
Enforcement Act: Hearingson S. 1468 Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopoly,
and Business Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 1468].
In some cases, defendants have negotiated settlements which contain indemnity provisions in order to protect themselves should Congress or the courts create a right of contribution. In one case, In re Cement and Concrete Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 296 (D. Ariz.
July 31, 1979), an initial settlement expressly provided for a reduction in judgment, if any,
by an amount equal to the settling defendant's contribution liability. See No. 927 ANTITRuST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-1 (August 16, 1979); Proposed Settlement Agreement
between Plaintiffs and Defendant Coleman Dairies, Inc., Little Rock School Dist. v. Borden,
Inc., [1980] 1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 63,059 (E.D. Ark. 1979). The effect of the indemnity
provision would depend upon the liability rule which is adopted. If contribution is not allowed, plaintiffs will not have to indemnify settling defendants. If contribution is adopted,
an indemnity provision in a settlement agreement would be equivalent to a claim reduction
provision. For example, assume that there are two equally liable defendants, and one defendant settles before trial for $2 million. If the total judgment liability is $6 million, the defendant who tried the case and lost has a judgment liability of $4 million. Asserting its right to
contribution, the defendant who lost will demand $1 million from the one who settled. If the
settlement contained an indemnity provision, the result after a setoff is that the plaintiff
would receive $1 million from the settling defendant, and $4 million from the defendant
who went to trial who, in turn, would receive $1 million from the settling defendant.
I REsOLUTIONS AND REPORT OF THE SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW OF THE AMERcAN BAR
AsSOCIATION ON PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF TFE CLAYTON ACT To PERMIT CONTRIBUTION IN
DAMAGE AcTiONs BROUGHT THEREUNDER (1979) [hereinafter cited as ABA REPORT]. The Report was accompanied by a minority report opposing any establishment of contribution
rights.

8 E.g., Corbett, Apportionment of Damages and Contribution Among Coconspirators
in Antitrust Treble Damage Actions, 31 FORDHAM L. REv. 111 (1962); Note, Contribution
Among Antitrust Violators, 29 CATH. U.L. REv. 669 (1980); Note, Contributionin Private
Antitrust Suits, 63 COROELL L. Rev. 682 (1978); Izard & Miller, High Price-FixingAwards
Require Abolition of Joint, Several Liability, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 27, 1979, at 22, col. 1.

19801

TREBLE DAMAGE SUITS

mentary concepts of game theory9 that a no-contribution rule is
one extreme, in the sense that this rule puts maximum pressure on
individual defendants to settle before other defendants and at the
latter's expense. Contribution and claim reduction, on the other
hand, give individual defendants an incentive to settle after, and
at the expense of, other defendants.
For example, if the defendants have a right to contribution
that cannot be extinguished by a settlement between some but not
all defendants, there would be little incentive to negotiate; settling

defendants could subsequently be held liable to those defendants
who elected to go to trial and lost. In such a legal environment no
settlement would be binding unless the settlement was agreed
upon unanimously. On the other hand, if a right to contribution is
created that permits binding settlements, some restrictions must
be placed upon these settlements, otherwise the plaintiffs could defeat the nonsettling defendants' right to contribution by settling
with some defendants for a nominal sum. In general, whenever a
defendant settles with the plaintiff for a sum less than three times
the damages attributable to its acts, each remaining defendant
faces an increased risk that it will be forced to bear more than its

proportionate share of the damages. 10
9 The theory of games of strategy, developed by John Von Neumann in 1928, and first
published in 1944, J. VoN NEUMANN & 0. MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMC
BEHAVIOR (3d ed. 1964), has assumed a fundamental role in providing general principles for
the study of decisionmaking, especially in the context of oligopolistic and monopolistic competition. See, e.g., M. SHUBIK, STRATEGY AND MARKET STRUCTURE: COMPETITION, OLIGOPOLY,
AND THE THEORY OF GAMES (1959); M. BACHARACH, ECONOMICS AND THE THEORY OF GAMES
66-72 (1977). Game theoryoprovides, however, a useful model for studying economic behavior in several decisionmaking contexts. A basic feature of the theory is the recognition that
the results of an economic decision do not depend merely upon the actions taken by one
rational decisionmaker or upon chance. Rather, the outcome is also affected by other entities who sometimes oppose, and sometimes support the action taken. Morgenstern, Foreword to M. SHUBIK, STRATEGY AND MARKET STRUCTURE: COMPETITION, OLIGOPOLY, AND THE
THEORY OF GAMES viii (1959). For a comprehensive description of the essentials of game
theory, see R.D. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, GAMEs AND DECISIONS, INTRODUCTION AND CRITICAL SURVEY (1957); J.C. McKINsEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF GAMES (1952). For a game
theoretic analysis of major business decisions @f the twentieth century, see J. McDONALD,
THE GAME OF BUSINESs (1975).
10 With regard to the treatment of settling defendants if contribution is allowed, compare the 1939 and 1955 versions of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, 12
UNIFORM LAws ANN. 57, 58 (1975), with the 1977 Uniform Comparative Fault Act, 12 UruFORM LAWS ANN. 27 (Supp. 1979) [hereinafter cited as the 1939, 1955, & 1977 Uniform Acts].
The 1939 Act provides that a tortfeasor who settles with an injured party remains liable to
nonsettling joint tortfeasors for contribution. 1939 Uniform Act, sapra, §§ 4, 5. Thus, regardless of settlement, the burden of compensating the injured party is distributed among
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The settlement issue has not, however, gone unrecognized by
Congress. The proposed Senate legislation stipulates that if one of
several defendants in a price-fixing suit settles with the plaintiff,
the total value of the judgment is to be reduced by the greater of
the amount stipulated by the release, the amount of consideration
paid for it, or treble damages attributable to the settling defendant's market share.11 This is the claim reduction or carve out provision of the bill. Game theory principles show, however, that contribution and claim reduction is too favorable to defendants
because it gives them an incentive to wait and settle last.1 2 Joint
and several liability without contribution, however, is too favorable
to plaintiffs because it puts too much pressure on individual defendants to settle first.' s
In this Article, settlement pressure is analyzed in the context
all joint tortfeasors according to the share of damage allocable to each one. The injured
party's claim is reduced only by the amount of settlement payments received. Tortfeasors
have little incentive to settle because they remain liable to other defendants for contribution. As an exception to the general rule, the 1939 Act allows a tortfeasor to avoid contributive liability if the injured party agrees to a pro rata reduction of its claim. 1939 Uniform
Act, supra, § 5. Plaintiffs' attorneys, however, usually have not been willing to agree to
reductions of claims. See 1955 Uniform Act, supra, § 4; Note, Contribution Among Antitrust Violators, 29 CATH. U.L. REV. 669, 673 n.23 (1980).
If the 1939 Act represents one extreme, the 1955 Act represents the other. The latter
provides that tortfeasors who settle in good faith with the injured party extinguish their
liability to nonsettling tortfeasors for contribution, and that the claim is reduced only by the
greater of the amount received for releasing the settling tortfeasor from liability or the
amount stipulated in the settlement agreement. 1955 Uniform Act, supra, § 4. Although the
1955 Act provides a strong incentive toward settlement, it does so at the expense of those
who do not settle. The burden of compensating the injured party would shift from those
who settle to those who do not because tortfesors generally will settle for less than their
proportionate share. Moreover, subject to the good faith limitation, the right to contribution
could be defeated by settling with some parties for a nominal sum.
By tying settlements to a pro rata claim reduction provision, the Uniform Comparative
Fault Act of 1977 attempted to avoid the Scylla of the 1939 Act, which substantially weakened the incentive to settle, and the Charybdis of the 1955 Act, which substantially weakened the right to contribution. The 1977 Act provides that upon settlement with one
tortfeasor, the injured party's claim against other tortfeasors is automatically reduced by
the amount of the released tortfeasor's equitable share of the joint obligation. 1977 Uniform
Act, supra, § 6. It would appear that this provision avoids the extremes indicated above and
prevents the injured party from shifting th# burden of paying for the injured party's losses
from settling to nonsettling defendants. However, as shown in the game theoretic analysis
discussed in Section II, claim reduction shifts bargaining power too much in favor of
defendants.
' S. 1468, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 41(b) (1979).
12 The pressure on individual defendants to settle last can be modeled by the Chicken
Game. See text accompanying note 34 infra.
' The incentive to settle before the other defendants can be modeled by the Prisoner's
Dilemma Game. See text accompanying note 30 infra.
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of four liability rules. In Rule One, which is most favorable to
plaintiffs and least favorable to defendants, the defendants have
no right to contribution. In Rule Two, which favors the plaintiff
over the defendant but to a lesser degree, the plaintiff chooses
which defendants to sue, but the no-contribution rule is modified
by giving all defendants a one-time opportunity to accept a minimum or pattern settlement. Rule Three, which is somewhat more
favorable to defendants than Rule Two, is Rule Two plus a right to
contribution against nondefendant violators equal to the minimum
or pattern settlement. Rule Four, contribution and claim reduction, is the most favorable to the defendants and the least
favorable to the plaintiffs. It is shown below that the two intermediate liability standards, represented by Rules Two and Three, will
adjust settlement pressure in a fairer manner than will Rules One
or Four.
Section I presents syllogisms for and against improving the
bargaining position of defendants in private treble damage suits.
Those who are against contribution and claim reduction usually argue in terms of a deterrence syllogism; those who are in favor of
contribution and claim reduction argue in terms of a blackmail syllogism. Section II uses elementary concepts of game theory to provide insights into the nature of bargaining power under a no-contribution rule, contribution and claim reduction, and intermediate
liability rules based upon minimum or pattern settlements.
I.

SYLLOGISMS FOR AND AGAINST IMPROVING THE BARGAINING
POSITION OF DEFENDANTS IN TREBLE DAMAGE SUITS

The major argument against improving the bargaining position of defendants in antitrust treble damage suits rests on deterrence. 14 There is evidence that business people are risk adverse;
that is, they are more likely to choose a high probability of a small
loss over a small probability of a large loss. 15 Second, there is evi4 See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 80 F.R.D. at 42; S. 1468, supra
note 6, at 17-19; Note, ContributionAmong Antitrust Violators, 29 CATH. U.L. REV. 669,

685-86 (1980); Note, Contribution in Private Antitrust Actions, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1540,
1544-48 (1980).
15 See Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 901 (5th
Cir. 1979), cert. grantedsub nom. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, 49 U.S.L.W. 3321
(U.S. Nov. 3, 1980); K. ELZINGA & W. BRrr, The Antitrust Penalties: A Study in Law and
Economics 117-26 (1976); E. MSHAN, COsT-BENEFrr ANALYsIs 306-07, 316, 338 (1976); Note,

Contributionin Private Antitrust Suits, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 682, 702-03 (1978).
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dence that some business people decide whether to violate antitrust laws based on risk-benefit analysis.18 Given that potential violators are rational and risk averse, the possibility that one violator
of many may have to bear the entire treble damage burden provides greater deterrence than if the burden were shared via contribution and claim reduction or through some other risk dispersion
method. 17 Thus, it is argued that a no-contribution rule maximizes
deterrence. As a representation of antitrust reality, however, this
deterrence syllogism is incomplete because it does not take into
account either the interests of potential antitrust plaintiffs", or the
substantial uncertainty that given conduct may or may not violate
10 John Shenefield, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division testified that if the contribution and claim reduction provisions of S. 1468 were adopted, it
would increase the possibility that businessmen would use risk-benefit analysis as an aid in
deciding whether a contemplated violation of the antitrust laws would be in a firm's best
interest. See Hearingson S. 1468, supra note 6, at 27. There is some evidence that businessmen have used this kind of analysis in deciding whether to engage in price fixing agreements. See ABA ANTrRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 2 & n.3 (Supp. 1979);
BusiNEss WEEIc, June 2, 1975, at 46-48 (quoting admissions by businessmen that criminal
fines were a small price to pay for the profits derived from price fixing); Note, Contribution
Among Antitrust Violators, 29 CATm. U.L. REv. 669, 693 (1980).
" The argument against contribution is that, since businessmen are risk averse, the
small prospect of a high penalty is a greater deterrent than a higher likelihood of lower
penalties. See Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d at 901; In re
Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 80 F.R.D. at 245. But cf. Professional Beauty
Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d at 1185; S. 1468, supra note 5, at 9
(deterrence may be increased by contribution because of greater probability of liability).
.8 In addition to the argument that a no-contribution rule is the best deterrent because
antitrust defendants are risk averse, see note 17 and accompanying text supra, it has been
noted that improving the defendant's position by allowing contribution might increase the
complexity of the litigation and thereby discourage private plaintiffs from bringing suit.
Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d at 905-06. Plaintiffs in
antitrust litigation have been afforded favorable treatment for reasons stated by the Supreme Court:
[t]he purposes of the antitrust laws are best served by insuring that the private
action will be an ever-present threat to deter anyone contemplating business behavior in violation of the antitrust laws ....
[Tihe law encourages [the private
plaintiff's] suit to further the overriding public policy in favor of competition. A
more fastidious regard for the relative moral worth of the parties would only result in seriously undermining the usefulness of the private action as a bulwark of
antitrust enforcement.
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968). The Perma
Life Court held that a claim in an antitrust action would not be barred, even though the
plaintiff participated in the violation, provided that the plaintiff was not a substantially
equal participant. Id. For ways in which the courts have effectuated the policy of encouraging private plaintiffs in antitrusts suits, see Sellers, Contributionin Antitrust Damage Actions, 24 VmL. L. REv. 829, 829 n.4 (1979).
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the antitrust laws.19
The syllogism in favor of improving the bargaining position of
defendants in antitrust suits rests on the possibility that ambiguities in the antitrust laws can be used as a vehicle for blackmail.
Assume that plaintiffs, or plaintiffs' lawyers, are rational profit
maximizers who wish to take advantage of the defendant's risk
aversion.2 Second, there is often a great deal of ambiguity as to
whether an antitrust violation has occurred. Thus, a no-contribution rule is said to encourage sham suits and blackmail 21 because it

19 Compare United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926) with Simpson v.
Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964). Although the antitrust rule which makes price fixing
illegal per se appears to be clear and concrete at first glance, in practical application, it often
requires delicate appraisals of conduct and sophisticated economic analysis. See Turner,
The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelismand Refusals
to Deal, 75 HArv. L. REv. 655 (1962). Turner showed that in the absence of direct evidence,
the courts often cannot determine whether oligopolistic firms quote nearly identical prices
due to an agreement to fix prices or because, as rational firms, they recognize their interdependence. Id. at 657. Turner's conclusions, which are solidly based on oligopoly theory, have
withstood subsequent challenges. See Markovits, OligopolisticPricing Suits, the Sherman
Act, and Economic Welfare, (parts I & 1I), 26 STAN. L. REv. 493, 717 (1974); (part I1), 27
STAN. L. REv. 307 (1975); (part IV), 28 STAN. L. REv. 45 (1975); Markovits, A Response to
ProfessorPosner,28 STAN. L. REv. 919 (1976); Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A
Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. Rhv. 1562 (1969); Posner, OligopolisticPricingSuits, the
Sherman Act, and Economic Welfare: A Reply to ProfessorMarkovits, 28 STAN. L. REv.
903 (1976); Spence, Markovits on Imperfect Competition, 28 STAN. L. REv. 915 (1976).
Even where there is open reciprocal exchange of price information, there may not be an
antitrust violation. In United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978), the
Supreme Court held that manufacturers of gypsum board could not be convicted of a conspiracy to fix prices on mere evidence that they telephoned one another to determine the
price currently being offered on gypsum board to specific customers. Id. at 435. Although
the Court said that intent must be established in a criminal antitrust violation, id. at 443, it
held that an "action undertaken with knowledge of its probable consequences and having
the requisite anticompetitive effects can be a sufficient predicate for a finding of criminal
liability under the antitrust laws." Id. at 444. A recent theoretical article illuminates and
clarifies this rule. See Dewey, Information, Entry, and Welfare: The Case for Collusion, 69
AmmR. ECON. REv. 586 (1979).
20 The assumption that defendants are risk averse is borne out by statistical evidence.
See Rowe, On FosteringFights, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1980, at A21, Col. 2. Rowe states that
"[albout 80 percent of all private antitrust cases are settled out of court. Most others end in
victory for the defendant. A recent study found that antitrust defendants won by a ratio of
7 to 1. Id. By these statistics, it seems senseless for defendants to settle. But, as Rowe
further points out:
Broad antitrust claims for many millions can be filed with minimal evidence and
imagination, and they set off extended discovery proceedings. A sophisticated defense is costly and drains the time of key executives ....
Thus, even with a 90
percent chance of ultimate vindication in a huge lawsuit, a few million paid for
peace can be a bargain--and a bonanza for the plaintiff and his lawyers.
Id.
21 See Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust
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exposes defendants to greater risk than does contribution and
claim reduction or some other liability rule which ameliorates settlement pressure on defendants. This blackmail syllogism is the
other side of antitrust reality.
The large increase in the number of antitrust treble damage
suits which have been instituted in the last twenty years 22 indicates the need to consider alternative methods of allocating damages in antitrust litigation which will discourage sham suits, yet
effectively deter antitrust violations. In this context, the views of
the Senate Judiciary Committee, the ABA, and the commentators
opinions~s in favor of contribution and claim reduction should be

broadly interpreted as a belief that the antitrust laws need some
adjustment.
II. A. GAME THEORETIC ANALYsis oF CONTRIBUTION AND CLAIM
REDUCTION

This section applies elementary concepts of game theory to
analyze settlement pressure in private antitrust suits under four

different liability rules. A basic distinction in game theory is made
between zero-sum games, where the sum of the gains and losses is
zero, and non-zero-sum, or potentially cooperative, games. 2 ' A waSuits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 9 (1971).
" In the early 1960's, private antitrust suits averaged around 300 per year (exclusive of
2,000 or more suits resulting from the electrical equipment conspiracy, most of which were
filed in 1962). In the late 1970's, private antitrust suits exceeded 1,200 per year. [1979]
TRADE REG. REP. No. 410 (Nov. 5, 1979).

13 Antitrust commentators disagree over whether the rights of plaintiffs should be expanded in the interests of deterrence, or whether the courts should adopt rules restricting
the number of suits in order to conserve judicial resources and to prevent blackmail. Compare Cirace, Price-Fixing,Privity, and the Pass-OnProblem in Antitrust Treble-Damages

Suits: A Suggested Solution, 19 WILIAM & MARY L. REv. 171 (1977) and Comment, Dam-

age Distributionin Class Actions: The Cy Pres Remedy, 39 U. Cm. L. REV. 448 (1972) and
Comment, Mangano and Ultimate-ConsumerStanding: The Misuse of the Hanover Doctrine, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 394 (1972) and Comment, Wrongs Without Remedy: The Concept
of ParensPatriaeSuits for Treble Damages Under the Antitrust Laws, 43 S. CAL. L. REv.
570 (1970) (plaintiffs' rights should be expanded) with Comegys, The Advantages and Disadvantages of a Class Suit Under New Rule 23 as Seen by the Treble Damage Defendant,
32 A.B.A. ANTrrRusT L.J. 271 (1966) and Handler & Bleichman, Antitrust and the Consumer Interest: The Fallacy of Parens Patriaeand a Suggested New Approach, 85 YALE
L.J. 626 (1976) and Landes & Posner, Should Indirect PurchasersHave Standing to Sue
Under the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois Brick, 47 U. Cm.
L. REV. 602 (1979).
24 R. LucE & H. RAiFPA, GAMEs AmW DECISIONS chs. 4-6 (1957); A. RAPOPORT, Two PERSON GAME THEORY chs. 7-9 (1966). Another basic distinction in game theory is between twoperson and more than two-person games, called n-person games. A. RAPOPORT, N-PERSON
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ger of a sum of money on a cut of a deck of ordinary playing cards
is an example of a zero-sum game between two rational players. A
lawsuit also can be thought of as a zero-sum game because what
the plaintiff wins, the defendant loses. The crucial aspect of zerosum games is that there is no incentive for cooperation between
rational players. Two-person, zero-sum games are strictly adversary games.2 5
In a non-zero-sum, or potentially cooperative, game between
two players, the outcome differs depending upon whether the players cooperate or compete. Direct negotiation may or may not be
allowed, but if the players adopt a cooperative strategy, they may
both profit.26 For example, economists have long analyzed the duopoly problem: What is the equilibrium price in a market served
by only two firms each selling an identical product? 27 Notwithstanding the assumption that each firm is a rational profit maximizer, there are a number of different and often intricate solutions
to this problem depending upon how each firm thinks the other
firm will react to its pricing policy, whether collusion is allowed,
what knowledge the firm possesses, and whether the firms learn
from experience. It is sufficient to say that the most profitable solution for both firms occurs when both charge the monopoly price
and sell half the monopoly output.2 8 This solution can be achieved
through direct cooperation (collusion) or through rational recognition of interdependence by the two firms (parallel action or tacit
collusion).2 9 If the firms do not cooperate completely, that is, if
they compete, both will be worse off in terms of the price and output. The essential point is that non-zero-sum games need not be
GAME THEORY chs. 7-12 (1970). Because it achieves stronger insights and conclusions in a

significantly simpler theoretical context, two-person game theory will be applied in this
Article. For an elementary discussion of two-person zero-sum games, see J.D. WILLus, THE

(1954).

COMPLEAT STRATEGYST
25 M. BACHARACH, ECONOMICS AND THE

ToRY OF GAMES 7-8 (1977); M. SHUBIK,

STRAT-

EGY AND MARKET STRUCTURE 10-11 (1959).
26 R. LucE & H. RAIFFA, supra note 24, at chs. 5-6; A. RAPOPORT, supra note 24, at chs.

8-9.

" D. DEWEY,

MICROECONOMIcs; THE ANALYSIS OF PRICES AND MARKETS 273-80 (1975);
supra note 25, at chs. 4-5; W. VICKERY, MICROSTATISTICS 303-14 (1964). The
original work on duopoly is A. CouRsoT, RzmAmcHns INTO THE MATHEMATICAL PmNCIPLES OF
THE THEORY OF WEALTH (N.T. Bacon trans. 1897).
23 E.H. CHAMBERLIN, THm THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC CoMPETITION 224 (8th ed. 1962); F.
MACHLUP, THE ECONOMICS OF SELLERS COMPETITION ch. 12 (1952); E. MANSFIELD,
M. SHUBIK,

MIcROECONOMIcs
29

333-46 (3d ed. 1979).

E. MANSFIELD, supra note 28, at 338.
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strictly adversary games; there are strategies for cooperation as
well as competition.
The Prisoner'sDilemma Model
The duopoly problem is actually a more complex version of a
well known non-zero-sum game called the Prisoner's Dilemma.30
As its name implies, the Prisoner's Dilemma game is modeled on
an age-old interrogation technique. Two suspects are interrogated
by police in different rooms so that they cannot communicate with
each other. If one informs on the other as the price of plea bargaining, and the other does not inform, the informer goes free and the
other is sentenced to ten years; if each informs on the other, both
get reduced sentences of five years; if neither of them informs on
the other, they are each sentenced to one year for illegal possession
of a weapon. The rational strategy for each suspect is to inform on
the other. The reason is that although the outcome in which both
suspects do not inform (-1, -1) is better for both than is the outcome in which both inform (-5, -5), it is unstable; there is always a
temptation for one player to double cross the other, bargain for
immunity, and go free. The dilemma lies in that when both suspects play it safe by confessing, they end up worse than had they
trusted each other and both not confessed.
A formal statement of the Prisoner's Dilemma is as follows:
Two rational players are assumed to choose between two strategies,
either to inform or not to inform on the other. In GAME MATRIX
ONE, the first number in any cell is the sentence of Player A, the
second number is the sentence of Player B. For example, if Player
A adopts a Not Inform strategy, and Player B adopts an Inform
strategy, Player A is sentenced to 10 years and Player B goes free.

30

R. Lucz & H. RA1PFA, supra note 24, at 94; A. RAPOPORT, supra note 24, at 128-32.

The Prisoner's Dilemma is simpler than the duopoly problem. There are fewer possible solutions due to the assumptions that each player has only two strategies (inform or not to
inform), and that each player has perfect knowledge of all the bargaining possibilities. In
addition, the game will be played only once, so that learning from *experience is impossible.
However, game theorists also have analyzed the Prisoner's Dilemma on the assumption that
it is played more than once by the same players. S. BRAMs, GAmE THEORY AND POLITICS 3233 (1975).
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Player B
Not
Inform

Not
Player A

7

1

Inform

-I,-1

Inform

0,M-10

Inform

70
0

,

PRISONER'S

-5,-5A

GAME MATRIX ONE

Liability Rule One: No Contribution
The Prisoner's Dilemma game can be used to model settlement pressure between plaintiffs and defendants in private antitrust suits. Assume a treble damage suit with joint and several
liability in which a plaintiff has chosen to sue two defendants. Although this is a zero-sum game from the point of view of plaintiffs
against defendants, once the possibility is raised that one of the
defendants may improve his position in relation to the other by
settling with the plaintiff first, the bargaining posture between the
defendants is recognized as that of the Prisoner's Dilemma. Unlike
the simple interrogation case, however, three settlement strategies
are possible for each defendant: (1) a defendant can attempt to
cooperate and settle together with the other defendant, a Settle
Together strategy; (2) a defendant can attempt to settle before the
other defendant, a Settle First strategy; or (3) a defendant can attempt to settle only if the other defendant settles, aSettle Second
strategy.
The outcomes associated with the several strategies are represented in GAM MATRIX Two. The first number in any cell repre-

sents the "payoff" or settlement which Defendant A would pay to
the plaintiff; the second number represents the amount Defendant
B would pay to the plaintiff.
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Defendant B

Settle
Together
Defendant
A

Settle
First

Settle
Together

Settle
First

Settle
Second

1, 1

2 1/8, 7/s

1 /2, 1 1/2

7/s, 2 /s

1/4, 1

12, 1 1/2

1 3/, 7/8

7/8,1 3/4

Settle
Second

1

1/2, 1

2

GAME MATRIX TWO

TRIX

For example, the numbers in the lower right cell of GAME MATwo (11/2, 11 ) indicate that if both defendants adopted a

strategy of attempting to Settle Second, there would be no settlement and, after trial, each would pay half of the treble damages.
The same reasoning applies to the lower left and upper right cells,
since if one defendant adopts a Settle Together strategy and the
other adopts a Settle Second strategy, there will be no settlement.
It is assumed that the defendants would have the greatest total bargaining power if they bargained as a unit and settled together; thus the upper left cell has the lowest payoffs or settlements (1,1). 32 If one defendant adopts a Settle First strategy and

the other adopts either a Settle Together or a Settle Second strategy, the defendant who settles first will be able to achieve the most
favorable settlement, but not so favorable as if it had negotiated as
a unit with the other defendant. It is assumed, therefore, that it
settles for 7/8.2 With joint and several liability, when one defendant settles, the other defendant is potentially liable for the difference between the payoff which the plaintiff would receive from
successfully litigating its claims, which is given an assumed value
of 3, and the amount previously paid by the settling defendant-stated arithmetically, 3-7/8
31

=

21/8. Even though the nonset-

See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 346-48 (1971);

Flintkote Co. v. LysfJord, 246 F.2d 368 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957).
" The choice of 7/8 as the payoff or settlement of the defendant who settles first, as
opposed to some other number, is arbitrary. Only the magnitude of the payoff relative to
other payoffs is significant. "Game theoretical conclusions, like all mathematical conclu-

sions, are based on givens and on the assmlption that these givens can be somehow made
known. The given payoffs are assumed to reflect the psychological worth of the associated
outcomes to the player in question. The task of determining these psychologically meaningful payoffs is the task of the psychologist, not of the game theoretician." A. RAPOPORT, supra
note 24, at 24. Thus, the magnitude of the payoff relative to other payoffs, rather than the
amount assigned to each payoff, is significant.
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tling defendant would lose 2'/s if it went to trial and lost, we will
assume that the plaintiff would agree to a concession of 3%in order
to forego the time -and effort of trial and, therefore, the defendant
who settles second will pay out 13 . Thus, if one defendant adopts

a Settle First strategy, and the other adopts a Settle Second strategy, the payoff will be

7,

1

/.

If both defendants adopt a Settle First strategy, the plaintiff
will know that defendants are eager to settle and will extract more
than if defendants would only Settle Together (1,1), but less than
the full treble damages a trial would produce (1

, 1

). There-

fore, it is assumed that if both adopt a Settle First strategy, the
payoff is 1 1/, 1 1 .Finally, if one defendant adopts a Settle First

strategy and the other adopts a Settle Together strategy, the defendant who settles first will pay 7/s for reasons given above, and
the defendant who adopts a Settle Together strategy will not be
able to settle. After trial, the nonsettling defendant will pay
2r/8-the difference between the total damage verdict and the
amount previously received in settlement.
Although in slightly more complicated form, this settlement
game is still a Prisoner's Dilemma. If each defendant is rational
and cannot be completely sure that the other defendant will agree
to, and not defect from, a Settle Together strategy, each will attempt to settle first. If a defendant attempts to settle first, the
least it will pay is 7/8, and the most 1 /. If it does not settle first, it
may pay as little as 1 if the defendants settle together. Given the
settlement pressure and the self-interest of each defendant, however, it is more likely that the defendant who chooses not to settle
first will pay between 1
and 2 '/8. Moreover, the pressure to
settle first becomes greater as the number of defendants increases
and the amount of total damages becomes potentially greater.3 3
'3 The difficulties faced by settling defendants are typified by the situation in In re
Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 84 F.R.D. 40 (S.D. Tex.), afl'd mem., 606 F.2d
319 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. dismissed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3281 (U.S. Oct. 21, 1980). That case, a
price-fixing suit, involved some 50 private class actions, brought against 37 companies representing roughly 70% of the container market. The Senate Committee pointed out that "because of the large number of defendants and the disparity in the size, market share, and
involvement in the alleged conspiracy, no sharing agreement existed. This, combined with
the unavailability of contribution, made possible a classic example of what one witness
called the whipsaw 'game theory' in application." Hearingson S. 1468, supra note 6, at 14.
The plaintiffs' strategy was to induce settlement by negotiating "discount" rates with those
who settled first. Id. Plaintiffs settled with the first defendant at $500,000 per percentage
point of market share, and the second at $1 million per point. Because the latter defendant
had an 8.3% market share, the sum deducted from the potential liability facing the other 35
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If contribution and claim reduction replace joint and several
liability without contribution, it would seem that the effect is
merely to change the lawsuit from one zero-sum game to several
zero-sum games. That is, claim reduction transforms the lawsuit
into a strictly adversary relationship between the plaintiff and
each defendant because the possibility of cooperation between the
plaintiff and one defendant at the expense of the other is removed.
Claim reduction, therefore, alters the bargaining relationship in
favor of the defendants. Moreover, the defendants' position is
further enhanced under this scheme because the cost of potential
trial is a joint cost and, therefore, it is impossible to separate totally the effect which one defendant's settlement has on another
defendant.
The Chicken Game Model
Whereas the no contribution rule puts the defendants in a
Prisoner's Dilemma and gives each a great incentive to settle first,
claim reduction encourages each defendant to settle last. This
alteration in settlement pressure can be modeled by the following
paradigm, known as the Chicken Game.
Assume that two automobiles start at opposite ends of a
straight track. The object is to reach the other's point of origin
first. If they do not cooperate, and each insists on staying in the
center of the track, a crash results. If they do cooperate-each
passes the other on the right as they approach-there is a draw.
But, if one intimidates the other by threatening to crash, thereby
forcing the other to concede it the center of the track, the intimidator will win the race. A formal statement of the Chicken Game is
presented in GAME MATRLX THREE. 4

defendants was only $8.3 million, far short of the $50-250 million traceable to the secondsettling defendant's own sales. This increased the settlement pressure on other defendants,
who then faced rising rates of $2 million a point and upward. Some later settling defendants
paid as much as $6.5 million a point. Id. For examples of settlement pressures in other
antitrust litigations, see id., at 16.
1 S. Brains, supra note 30, at 39-47; A. RAPOPORT, supra note 24, at 137-42.
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Player B

Cooperate

Cooperate

Do Not
Cooperate

0, 0

-2, 2
CHICKEN

Player A

Do Not
Cooperate

GAME
2, -2

-5,-5

GAME MATRIX THREE

The Chicken Game resembles the Prisoner's Dilemma in that
both players will be better off if they adopt cooperative rather than
noncooperative strategies. Moreover, in both games, the players are
tempted to defect from the cooperative outcome. There are, however, two distinct differences between the games. First, the worst
outcome in the Chicken Game occurs when both players do not
cooperate. This is the next to worst outcome for both players in
Prisoner's Dilemma, the worst occurring to the player who cooperates with the other (does not inform) when his opponent does not
cooperate (informs). The major distinction between the two games
is that there is a dominant strategy in the Prisoner's Dilemma, but
not in the Chicken Game. A dominant strategy exists when there is
a best strategy which a player can adopt regardless of the strategy
the other player adopts. 5 In the Prisoner's Dilemma, as shown
above, the dominant strategy is to inform on the other prisoner.
Consider both cases: a player should inform if it knows the other
player will also inform so as to reduce its sentence from 10 to 5
years; this player should also inform if it knows the other will not
inform so as to reduce its sentence from 1 year to no sentence at
all. In the Chicken Game, there is no dominant strategy. A Do Not
Cooperate strategy is the best answer to the other player's Cooperate strategy so as to increase the payoff from 0 to 2, whereas a
Cooperate strategy is the best answer to the other player's Do Not
Cooperate strategy so as to increase the payoffs from -5 to -2.- 6
Id., at 55; R. LUCE & H. RAmFA, supra note 24, at 79.
36 In terms of the verbal paradigm, if one player knows that the other will not chicken
out, that is, would crash rather than leave the center of the road, then the first player
should chicken out, that is, leave the center of the road. But, if one player knows that the
other will chicken out, that player should remain in the center of the road. On the other
hand, in the Prisoner's Dilemma, a player should always inform on the other, regardless of
whether the other chooses an Inform or Not Inform strategy.
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Liability Rule Four: Contribution and Claim Reductions7
In GAME MATRIX FOUR, the effect of contribution and claim
reduction on a treble damage suit involving two defendants and
their three settlement strategies is analyzed. For the purpose of the
model, we assume that the plaintiff sued two defendants, Defendant A and Defendant B.
Defendant B
Settle

Settle
Together

Settle

Together

Defendant
A

Settle
First
Settle
Second

First

1, 1

11
1

1

1 1/

1

,1

, 1 1/
,1

Settle
Second

/4

1

,

f

7

/1,1/ 1/

1

1,1

1

1/4,V

1

, 1 1/2

GAME MATRIX FOUR

The four corner cells and the center cell-the cells on the two
diagonals-have the same payoffs as those in the corresponding
cells in GAME MATRIX Two and are based on the logic of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. The remaining four cells are different. If
Defendant A follows a Settle First strategy, and Defendant B follows a Settle Second strategy, the plaintiff will not be as eager to
make concessions to the defendant who settles first as it would
under the no-contribution rule because (1) it knows that settling
with one defendant will not put more pressure on the other defendant to settle-the liability of the remaining defendant does not
increase because the plaintiff settled with the other; and (2) once
the plaintiff settles with Defendant A, both the plaintiff and Defendant B know that whether a trial takes place depends solely on
whether they settle. Therefore, Defendant B is in a better bargaining position than Defendant A who settled first. Thus, under a
claim-reduction rule, it is likely that the plaintiff will expect to receive more from the first defendant who settles and less from the
second defendant who settles after the shift in settlement pressure.
Under claim reduction, the plaintiff is assumed to receive 1 , 7/8
37 The liability rules are discussed out of sequence for expository convenience. Rule
One is an extreme in the sense that it favors plaintiffs excessively; Rule Four favors defendants excessively. After defining the extremes, intermediate Rules Two and Three, which
attempt to balance settlement pressure more equitably, are discussed.
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from the first and second settlements respectively, as opposed to
7
/, 1 3 under the no-contribution rule. If one defendant adopts a
Settle First strategy and the other adopts a Settle Together strategy, the defendant who adopts the Settle First strategy will pay
1
for the reasons given above; the defendant who adopted a Settle Together strategy will not be able to settle and, assuming it
loses the trial, will pay the maximum amount under claim reduction, 1 1/2.
What settlement strategy should be followed under claim reduction? Unlike the Prisoner's Dilemma in which there is a dominant strategy (always settle first) claim reduction results in a
Chicken Game with no dominant strategy-there is no one strategy which is best to follow no matter what strategy the other defendant adopts. In the antitrust setting, however, the defendants
could consistently adopt a dual strategy of either settle together or
settle second, but do not settle first. If one defendant settles first
because the trial date is approaching and it has not prepared its
case, it pays 1 , whereas the defendant who settles second pays
only %. If neither defendant turns "chicken," the result is either a
settlement together, in which case they pay 1 and 1 respectively, or
a trial, which if they lose, they each pay 11/. Of course, the more
defendants there are, the greater the leverage wielded by those
who settle later and last.
In short, under. a no-contribution rule there is a powerful incentive to settle first due to the Prisoner's Dilemma, whereas
under a claim reduction liability rule, there is a powerful incentive
to settle last due to the Chicken threat.
Liability Rule Two: No Contribution Modified by Minimum
Settlements
In the following subsections, legal rules are suggested which
will adjust the settlement pressure between plaintiffs and defendants in a fairer manner than results under a no-contribution rule
(Prisoner's Dilemma) or under contribution and claim reduction
(Chicken Game). These rules are based upon minimum or pattern
settlements which are described as follows: Once a plaintiff makes
a settlement with any defendant, the remaining defendants would
be given a one-time opportunity of accepting the terms of this
minimum settlement, 8 adjusted for market shares when possible,
38 See Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., No. 75-23-N, slip op. at 4 (M.D. Ala. May 19,
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or in the alternative pro rata,39 or risk subsequent settlement or
trial with the attendant risk of paying more than their proportionate share of damages. That is, if defendants refuse the minimum
settlement, they will face the same settlement pressure induced
under the no-contribution rule (Prisoner's Dilemma). To prevent
collusion between the plaintiff and a defendant concerning the
terms of the minimum settlement, if subsequent settlements contain more favorable terms, all defendants who agreed to the minimum settlement should receive the more favorable terms. Thus, all
defendants will have a one-time opportunity to accept the most
favorable or minimum settlement terms.4 0
Liability Rule Two has two advantages. First, this rule is superior to strict joint and several liability where no contribution is
permitted because it does not allow plaintiffs to favor any defendants at the expense of other defendants. Second, this rule is superior to claim reduction because it retains most of the settlement

pressure of strict joint and several liability and does not give de1979).
Sg If contribution is adopted in antitrust suits in which price fixing is alleged, treble
damages or claim reduction should be apportioned on the basis of market shares. For example, in In re Corrugated Containers Antitrust Litigation, 84 F.R.D. 40 (S.D. Tex.), afl'd
mem. 606 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. dismissed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3281 (U.S. Oct. 21, 1980),
the estimated amount of treble damages was one billion dollars and the market shares of the
thirty-seven defendants ranged from .375% to 8.56%. 84 F.R.D. at 41. If a billion dollar
damage award were apportioned equally among the thirty-seven defendants on a pro rata
basis, each firm would pay approximately thirty million dollars. On a market share basis,
the firm with the smallest share of the market would pay $3.75 million, whereas the company with the largest share would pay $85.6 million. Id. Thus, in the CorrugatedContainers
example, if a pro rata criterion were used instead of a market share criterion, the firm with
the largest market share would avoid approximately 55 million dollars in damages and the
firm with the smallest market share would be liable for approximately 26 million dollars in
additional damages. Under pro rata contribution, therefore, firms with larger market shares
would be deterred less than firms with the small market shares since the former would avoid
much of the liability attributable to their own illegal acts. 29 CATH. L. REV., supra note 8, at
688-89.
On the other hand, if contribution is to be allowed in suits such as Professional Beauty
Supply v. National Beauty Supply, 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979), in which the plaintiff, a
wholesaler-dealer of cosmetic products alleged that a competitor conspired with a manufacturer of beauty supplies to terminate the plaintiff and grant an exclusive franchise to the
competitor in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976), it must be on a
pro rata basis because courts will be reluctant to apportion damages according to relative
guilt and because there is no objective method to apportion damages.
40 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure presently require judicial approval of proposed

settlement agreements in class action litigation. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e). If this rule were expanded to require judicial approval in all treble damage antitrust litigation, the courts could
easily apply the pattern setting settlement rule suggested in the text.
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fendants an incentive to settle last.
Liability Rule Three: Rule Two With a Right to Contribution
Equal to the Minimum Settlement
Liability Rule Three is Rule Two plus a right to contribution
against nondefendant violators equal to the minimum or pattern
settlement. Under Rule Three, defendants who are liable for more
than the pattern settlement would have a right to contribution for
the excess from nondefendant violators who would be liable up to
the pattern settlement. Rule Three, while similar to Rule Two, is
more advantageous to defendants in that it prevents plaintiffs
from favoring any antitrust violators who have injured the plaintiff, not just those violators the plaintiff chooses to sue as defendants as in Rule Two. Rule Three places less settlement pressure
on defendants than Rule One or Two, but does not reduce it as
much as Rule Four.
Either Rule Two or Rule Three will adjust settlement pressure
more fairly than Rules One or Four and are, therefore, preferable.41
The choice between these two intermediate liability rules depends,
however, upon how one weighs the unfairness of allowing the entire
burden of compensatory and punitive damages to be placed upon
one of several joint tortfeasors-because of the plaintiff's whim,
spite, or collusion with other violators-against the chilling effect
on commencements of meritorious actions due to the dangers of
increased complexity, the plaintiffs loss of control through multiple third-party actions seeking contribution, 2 and the reduction in
the deterrent power of the antitrust laws discussed in Section I.
CONCLUSION

The Prisoner's Dilemma model has shown that prohibiting
contribution among antitrust violators unduly favors plaintiffs be41 The four liability rules are ordered from the most favorable to plaintiffs, Rule One,
to the least favorable to plaintiffs, Rule Four.
42 Although district court judges' power to sever issues and parties may allow them to
manage the increased complexity and prevent plaintiffs from losing control of the case due
to a defendant's impleading of multiple parties to seek contribution, Professional Beauty
Supply v. National Beauty Supply, 594 F.2d 1179, 1184-85 (8th Cir. 1979), the mere possibility of increased complexity could have a chilling effect on an injured party's incentive to
nr-, dissenting); see Wilson P. Abraham
bring a meritorious action. Id. at 1189-90; *
Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 905-06 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted sub
nom. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 351 (1980).
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cause it places too much pressure on individual defendants to settle first and at the expense of the other defendants. In other
words, this liability rule exascerbates the blackmail problem.'3 On
the other hand, the Chicken Game model has demonstrated that
contribution and claims reduction is too favorable to defendants
because it gives them an incentive to wait and settle last at the
expense of the other defendants. That is, claim reduction significantly reduces the deterrent effect of the treble damages provision. 4 Finally, two intermediate liability rules based on minimum
or pattern settlements have been examined and shown to be more
equitable in balancing settlement pressures among the parties.
Which of these two rules is actually preferable, however, depends
upon several factors. Although some have argued that plaintiffs
choose not to sue more than one defendant out of fear of the economic power of the unnamed violators, 5 there are indications that
plaintiffs may be more inclined to overinclusiveness rather than
underinclusiveness in naming defendants. 4 An additional consideration is the reduction in the deterrent effect of the antitrust laws
which would result should more plaintiffs of smaller means decline
to engage in private antitrust actions because of the increased complexity caused by freely allowing third-party complaints for
contribution.

4' See

notes 20-21 and accompanying text supra.

44 See notes 14-17 and accompanying text supra.

"I See Wilson 0. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 901 (5th
Cir. 1979), cert. granted sub nom. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 101 S. Ct
351 (1980); Professional Beauty Supply v. National Beauty Supply, 594 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th
Cir. 1979); Delone, supra note 8, at 685.
" See Hearings on S.1468 supra note 6, at 67 (prepared testimony of Donald G.
Kempf, Jr.).

